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  Recent dissatisfaction with the impact of expenditure stimulus on economic 
activity in the United States, along with the results of recent research studies (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2009, Romer and Romer, 2007 and forthcoming, Sahm et al, 2009, Mountford 
and Uhlig 2008, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), have once again raised questions about the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus policies and about whether stimulus to a recessionary 
economy should be in the form of tax cuts or expenditure increases. (Mankiw, 2009) 
One of the difficulties of putting a quantitative dimension on the tools of fiscal 
policy has been the effort by many economists to extend thinking beyond traditional 
Keynesian macro model simulation approaches. Recent studies have tried to put the 
impact of fiscal policy into a neoclassical general equilibrium framework, with rational 
expectations and/or real business cycles. To avoid theoretical priors, empirical testing has 
been largely based on vector autoregressive systems, albeit with imposed constraints. 
Such efforts should not get in the way of realistic quantification. Nor should they be the 
basis for politically-motivated policy prescription, as happens all too often. The 
effectiveness of policy is an important current issue. The need for stimulus remains acute. 
Public deficits and debts have reached unprecedented highs.  It is important that the tools 
of fiscal policy stimulus be evaluated realistically so that they will be as effective, per 
dollar of expenditure or revenue loss, as possible.  
                                                           
* We wish to thank Nariman Behravesh and Nigel Gault for access to the IHS Global Insight model.  All 
conclusions are our own and not those of IHS Global Insight. 
  1This paper considers alternative methods for evaluating the impacts of stimulus 
policy strategies.  First, we discuss some conceptual issues involved in effectiveness 
measurement.  Next, we consider alternative empirical approaches applied in recent 
studies and the problems encountered.  We include our own estimates of policy 
multipliers based on simulations of the IHS Global Insight model of the US economy.  
We then try to answer the question of why recent US stimulus programs have not been 
more effective.  Finally, we draw some general conclusions from our review of existing 
research and recent experience. 
A Critical Distinction  
  A critical distinction is between the direct spending effects and the multiplier 
response to stimulus (or contractionary) policies.  The total effect of a stimulus program 
represents the sum of its first round expenditure effects (FRE) and its incentive effect 
(IE), multiplied by the system multiplier (M). The first round spending effect (FRE) 
represents the direct increase in expenditure of an increase in government spending or the 
amount of expenditure related to the reduction in taxes or increase in transfer payments. 
Presumably, personal tax and transfer measures will have their first round impact by 
stimulating consumer spending.  
Incentive effects (IE) represent the increases or decreases in expenditures that 
result from policy-related changes in incentives. The incentive effect represents the 
impact on behavior as a result of the stimulus, other than simply having more or less 
money in your pocket. The incentive effect will also include the results of endogenous 
adjustment in prices and interest rates that may crowd out a portion of the demand 
change.  General tax or spending measures may have important incentive effects.  Indeed, 
  2that is a central concern of neoclassical models that suggest that increased  government 
spending may impose negative incentives, crowding out private consumption or 
investment.  Importantly, many tax or spending measures are designed explicitly to 
influence other dimensions of economic behavior.  The investment tax credit is a classic 
example, as is the “cash for clunkers” program, and, most recently, the employment 
incentive programs.  In these cases the stimulus effect is not only the direct effect through 
added consumption as a result of added income but additionally the effects of changes in 
behavior—investment, purchases of new cars, and employment of additional workers.  
The system multiplier (M) is the total per dollar effect of changes in first round 
expenditures (increases or reductions), once additional spending has been induced 
through the economy’s expenditure—production—income—expenditure circuit, so that,  
dGDP = (FRE + IE) * M.                                                                       (1)  
The typical empirical measure of the multiplier effect of a stimulus, the measured 
multiplier  (Mm), is  computed in one figure as the increase in GDP divided by the 
change in expenditures (or taxes):   
Mm = dGDP/dE or dGDP/dT.                                                            (2)         
The denominator of this expression may be the sum budgeted, or, as in many cases of 
analysis with time series data, it may be the amount of change in the government budget 
associated with the fiscal change.  In the latter case, this is an endogenously determined 
figure, usually but not always smaller than the budgeted amount.
1  
The multiplier must be measured over a period long enough to allow the 
incentives and related economic circuits to operate, a period that may differ with the type 
of measure imposed.  (See the discussion below.) 
                                                           
1 That depends on whether the impact of fiscal action is expansionary or contractionary. 
  3   Table 1 summarizes in approximate terms what many economists anticipate on 
the basis of traditional Keynesian economic modeling for direct and indirect effects and 
measured multipliers.  The main conclusions are:  
•  the  first round effect of tax cuts is likely to be much smaller than that of 
expenditures, 
•  the system multiplier is likely to take a value of 1.5  to 2 for expenditures 
and 0.9 to 1 for general taxes and transfers, much lower than what is 
sometimes computed  in the classroom on the basis of simplified theory,  
•  but, per dollar of government expenditure or revenue loss, some tax 
incentives may be more effective than spending or general tax reduction.   
Table 1 
Approximate Effects and Multipliers of Alternative Stimuli 
 Change  in 
Expenditures 














on Goods and 
Services (dE) 
1.0  1.0  0  1.5 to 2.0  1.5 to 2.0 
Income Tax Cuts or 
Transfers (dT, dY) 
1.0  0.3 to 0.5  0  1.5 to 2.0  0.45 to 1.0 
Tax incentives, 




3.0-6.0 1.5-2.0  4.5-12.0 
 
A Question of Timing 
  The timing of the effect of stimulus policy is also an important consideration.  
Since most recessions occur without clear prior warning, it is important that policy be 
effective quickly in influencing GDP and employment. The delays associated with 
implementing counter-cyclical measures mean that they frequently take effect after the 
  4bottom of the recession has been reached. The timing of the removal of stimulus 
measures is also an important consideration. Table 2 illustrates the typical thinking about 
the delays encountered.  We speak about inside lags, that occur while the public sector 
decision is being made “inside” the government, and outside lags, those resulting from 
the time it takes the economy to make use of the stimulus after it has been put in place. 
Table 2 
Inside and Outside Lags of Government Stimulus Policy 
  Inside Lag  Outside Lag 
Fiscal Policy—expenditure 
increase or tax cut 
Depends on political 
system—in the US , long 
but could be short 
Depends on policy 
management— thought to 
be short but in US, long. 
Fiscal Policy—incentive 
program 
Depends on political 
system—in the US , long 
Long lag  




  The time dimensions visualized in Table 2 are approximately one to two quarters 
for short lags, and 8 to 12 quarters for long lags. But incentive programs may entail still 
longer lags. 
The inside or decision-making lags depend on the political framework in which 
they are invoked, so that the inside fiscal lag, which is typically long in the United States 
as a result of extended discussions in Congress, may be much shorter in a parliamentary 
system.  Monetary policy that is administered by a central bank is likely to have a shorter 
inside decision lag. It has generally been assumed that outside lags for fiscal policy are 
quite short.  In theory, expenditures and or tax cuts can be implemented quickly. In 
practice, recent experience in the United States suggests that it takes time to implement 
expenditure programs. Incentive tax measures and monetary policy are likely to take 
  5more time to become effective as they rely on decision making in the private sector that 
may stretch over a lengthy period.  For this reason, they may be more appropriate for 
long run growth policies than for short run stabilization. 
An interesting aspect is the question of whether the program faces a time 
constraint, whether it is a one-time benefit and/or whether it is set to expire at a specific 
date. Economic theory (Friedman, 1957, Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) would suggest 
that a tax cut favoring consumers would have more direct effect on expenditures if it 
were permanent or extended over a long period since consumers are unlikely to change 
their expenditure patterns for a short term or one-time tax reduction.  On the other hand, 
it is possible that crowding out effects could be larger—and net policy effects smaller—if 
a permanent policy shift creates expectations of large budget deficits down the road.  In 
the case of a tax incentive program that is explicitly limited to a short period, consumers 
and investors facing a time deadline may quickly take advantage of it before it expires.  
Like the US “cash for clunkers” and home purchase programs, consumers may advance 
their purchases to take advantage of the incentive, thus transferring some purchases from 
the future to the present.  At the expiration of the program, the effect may be reversed to 
the extent that expenditures have been borrowed from the future. Given the difficulty of 
predicting the timing of a business cycle recovery, this may pose some challenges,  
Alternative Approaches to Effect Measurement  
The literature on measuring the effect of stimulus and stabilization policies is very 
large
2. We will focus on the most recent studies representative of alternative approaches.  
In an effort to emphasize post-Keynesian theory, this work has taken a number of new 
                                                           
2 Rather than summarize the extensive literature, we recommend summaries in Alesina and Ardagna (2009) 
p. 3, Mountford and Uhlig, 2006, p. 2, and CBO, 1990). A longer summary is Hemming et al (2002) 
  6directions. We focus here on fiscal policies, changes in expenditures and taxes, but there 
is also an extensive literature on the effectiveness of monetary policy (Uhlig, 2005)     
Historical/ Episodic Approach     
Historical views of multiplier effects, descriptive or empirical, run into the 
difficulty that the impact of tax or expenditure changes must be disentangled from 
everything else that may be going on at the same time. In most cases this has meant the 
selection of particular periods for analysis, an “episodic” approach.  
A recent paper in the episodic tradition is Romer and Romer’s  (2007, 
forthcoming) study. Its conceptual framework is to use “the historical record to identify 
the motivations, revenue effects, and other characteristics of legislated post war tax 
changes,” to “separate legislated tax changes into those that can legitimately be used to 
estimate the macroeconomic effects of tax changes, and those that are likely to be 
contaminated by other developments.” (p.2)   
The difficulty the Romers faced with using the historical record is precisely the 
problem of holding “everything else” constant. They deal with this problem by separating 
tax changes on the basis of their intent; those that are intended for countercyclical 
purposes or to offset an increase in spending, as distinguished from those that are 
intended for other purposes: to affect long-run growth, to remedy an inherited 
government debt, or to improve fairness, for example. The “intent” is the Romer’s 
perception of what lies behind the tax action at the legislative level. However, the 
taxpayer, or for that matter, the legislator, may not always know or care what the intent of 
the legislation had been.  Somewhat counter-intuitively, the former tax changes are called 
endogenous and the latter are described as exogenous.  
  7Endogenous tax changes imply that, because the tax change is intended to be 
countercyclical or to offset increased expenditures, other things are going on at the same 
time. In that case, the Romers argue, the effect of the tax change cannot be measured 
without bias from the historical data. For example, suppose that a recession is anticipated 
and the tax change is designed to put sufficient purchasing power into the economy to 
bring it back to its target. The tax change is considered endogenous because of the 
objective of cyclical remediation; it is intended to offset ongoing recessionary forces. The 
statistical record following the tax change will reflect a combination of negative market 
forces as well as the impact of the tax cut, making it impossible to distinguish its separate 
impact.   
Exogenous tax changes are seen as being made in the absence of other correlated 
changes in the economy.  It is assumed that recorded changes in the economy following 
the tax change represent its impact.  If there is an increase in GDP growth and/or in GDP 
components like investment, other than their prevailing trend, these are said to represent 
tax change effects. These tax changes, which represent a selection out of the total, are the 
basis for evaluating the impact of tax changes.  
The rationale behind this distinction does not lie in a hypothesis that different 
kinds of tax changes have different impacts.  Rather, it is imposed as a necessity to deal 
with the fact that the historical method used does not provide counterfactuals.  In these 
cases, we do not know what would have happened in the absence of the tax change. Note 
that if the tax stimulus is successful in achieving its objective, its measured impact would 
be exactly zero! And, if it does not achieve its objective, its measured impact on the path 
of the economy may well appear to be adverse.  
  8The Romers find that so-called “exogenous” tax changes have a multiplier of 
approximately 3, a point they emphasize, whereas calculations based more broadly on all 
tax changes or on endogenous tax changes show multipliers in a more conventional   0.5 
to 1.5 range. The Romers’ approach represents selective history, not a very reliable way 
to measure the impact of countercyclical policy.  
Alesina and Ardagna (2009) compare the impact of tax and spending change over 
a universe of OECD countries from 1970 to 2007.  While the basic methodology employs 
statistics, we refer to it also as episodic since the authors select a limited number of 
periods
3 when large changes in the fiscal balance occurred. Only episodes (years) when 
cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance improves (or deteriorates)  by more than 1.5% 
of GDP were included, hence the reference in the title of the article to “large” changes in 
fiscal policy. This means that small fiscal changes, some of which may be important but 
were spread over several years, are not taken into account. Business cycle effects are 
eliminated by using cyclically adjusted variables and by computing differences between 
the data before and the data after the fiscal change. Fiscal changes are distinguished 
between stimuli and “adjustments”, presumably reductions, either of which can take the 
form of changes in expenditures or changes in taxes.  A further distinction is made 
between times when the impact on the economy was substantially positive and those 
when it was small or negative. The results of such calculations are summarized briefly in 
Table 4. 
 
                                                           
3 Only 6 % of the available country/year points are included. 
  9Table 4 
Effects of Fiscal Stimuli and Adjustments: Statistics of Episodes in Fiscal 
Policy Study (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009) 
(change in % of GDP, after cyclical adjustment) 
Growth Fiscal  Stimuli  Fiscal Adjustments 
 Expansionary Contractionary  Expansionary Contractionary 
GDP 0.47  -1.1  1.54  0.22 
Govt. expenditure.  1.05  2.84  2.19  -0.64 
Transfers 0.18  1.22  -0.58  0.47 
 Govt. Revenues  2.57  0.42  0.34  1.21 
Private Investment  3.99  -3.29  6.49  2.11 
Source: Tables 1 and 2 Alesina and Ardagna (2009) 
 
Explaining these data, the change in GDP in the expansionary and contractionary 
cases simply reflects the computed results for the episodes, whether they resulted in 
expansion or contraction. Other data are the computed accompanying changes in 
expenditures, revenues, and private investment. . Fiscal stimuli show a small positive 
effect or a negative effect that seems to be associated with what happens to private 
investment.  The fiscal “adjustments”, surprisingly, also show some expansionary effects 
which appear to be associated with government spending and, again, private investment.  
This study, as well as a predecessor (Alesina et al., 1999) suggests that there are strong 
negative relationships between public spending, profits, and investment. 
Note that this work covers a range of OECD countries that are likely to differ 
greatly in size, and openness and, consequently, in their ability to carry on independent 
policy.  We note, for example, that the seemingly perverse results found for Denmark and 
Ireland (Hassett, 2009) may simply reflect these small open countries’ economic 
structures. While this data source provides a large number of observations, the 
  10heterogeneity of the underlying cases may undermine the reliability of the results 
obtained.  
A simple regression analysis supporting this work shows a negative relationship 
between GDP growth and government spending, along, of course, with a selection of 
other explanatory variables.   
On this basis, Alesina and Ardargna reach strong conclusions. They write that, 
“Our results suggest that tax cuts are more expansionary than spending increase in the 
case of financial stimulus.” (p.3) “This correlation seems to suggest that stimulus 
packages used along the spending side do not work…..” (p.10)  “…fiscal stimuli more 
heavily associated with current spending items…are associated with lower growth, while 
fiscal stimulus packages based on cuts in expenditures, business and indirect taxes are 
more likely to be expansionary.” (p. 14) “In this respect the US stimulus plan seems too 
much based upon spending” (p. 15) One may disagree on whether their statistical results 
justify such unqualified conclusions. 
Vector Autoregressive Approaches 
Numerous studies have approached the empirics of fiscal policy with variants of  
reduced form or vector autoregressive calculations. Among these, perhaps the most well 
known is Blanchard and Perotti (2002) whose VAR approach  introduces structural 
considerations and dummy variables for some large tax change episodes to separate 
exogenous tax  and spending changes from cyclical ones. The analysis uses quarterly data 
for the United States. 
Blanchard and Perotti conclude by finding systematically positive effects on GDP 
for expenditure increases and negative ones for tax increases.  These are consistent with 
  11standard theory, though the multipliers obtained are small (over a period of 12 quarters) 
in the range of 0.66 to 1.13  for expenditures and 0.43 to 1.30 for tax cuts depending on 
the underlying assumptions about the trend.  Most interesting, however, is the implication 
that private investment is crowded out by changes in government expenditures but with 
considerable time delay. 
Arin and Koray (2005) investigate the effect on output of different categories of 
government expenditures and taxes.  Decomposing taxes, they find that indirect taxes and 
corporate taxes have contractionary effects, while personal taxes have neither 
contractionary nor expansionary effects.  In turn, expenditures on wages and salaries have 
a contractionary effect and defense spending has expansionary effects.  These results are 
not self-explanatory, though they suggest that disaggregation might be useful. 
  Non-Structural Statistical Studies 
There have been numerous vector autoregressive studies of tax and expenditure 
effects.
4  Most recently this work has sought to deal with the problems of identification 
with an “agnostic” identification procedure (Uhlig, 1997).  We refer particularly to 
Mountford and Uhlig (2008). The basis for this study is quarterly data for the United 
States economy. The aim is to filter out the automatic responses of fiscal variables to 
business cycle variations and to obtain fiscal shocks that are orthogonal to  the business 
cycle and to monetary policy variations. Vector autoregressive techniques are 
supplemented with sign restrictions.  Mountford and Uhlig  find relatively large tax cut 
responses, a multiplier for a deficit financed tax cut of 0.93 after 4 quarters and 3.41 after 
12 quarters. (Mountford and Uhlig, 2008, Table 3).  Deficit-financed spending policy 
                                                           
4 See discussion in Hemming et al. (2002) 
  12yields a multiplier of only 0.27 after 4 quarters and a negative effect of 1.19 after 12 
quarters (Mountford and Uhlig, 2008, Table 4). These results reflect only a small increase 
in consumption at the beginning of the stimulus and negative impacts on investment.   
Cross Section Survey Studies 
While difficulties of reconciling aggregate information with cross section studies 
are well known, survey studies provide information on the first stage, direct effects, of 
changes in personal taxes.  They may also provide information on the indirect effects 
associated with incentive tax schemes. Most recently, the 2008 tax rebate, a tax credit of 
$300 to $600 for single people and $600 to $1,200 for married couples, available to a 
broad group of households, was studied (Sahm et al., 2009).  The survey results suggest 
that roughly one-third of the rebate income was spent in 2008 and that the spending 
response was concentrated in the first few months after receipt. Note, however, that 
households that said they saved the rebate or used it to pay off debt might later increase 
their spending.  Aggregate national accounts numbers and other micro surveys
5 support 
this result. (Sahm et al., op cit)  This analysis does not account for indirect effects or the 
multiplier. Taking account of a multiplier effect would yield impacts on the low end of 
the estimates in Table 1. 
Econometric Model Multiplier Estimates 
  Simulations with econometric models have been the traditional methodology for 
evaluating multipliers. The advantage of such calculations is that simulations with and 
without tax changes provide a simple mechanism of comparing what if alternatives, one 
that embodies the expenditure or tax change and one that does not.  Assumptions about 
                                                           
5 Twelve survey studies showed spending of the rebate in a range from 19% to 53%, with a mean of 27%. 
(Sahm et al. op cit. Table 16) 
  13other aspects of policy and/or relationships with neighboring countries can also be 
specified.   
Admittedly, the results of such calculations depend on the theory embodied in the 
model and its parameters. Most macro models are constructed around the Keynesian 
demand paradigm with important feedback from the supply side. The structure of the 
typical model takes the economy’s capacity constraints into account, so that model 
responses depend on the economic environment, for example whether output is at or 
below its capacity ceiling. While most applied econometric models do not impose 
rational expectations or Ricardian equivalence,
6 they are likely to provide adequate 
descriptions of the aggregate economy’s behavior. particularly over the short and medium 
term. Because the situation in which stimulus or contractionary policies are applied 
differ, it is important to base simulation exercises on a starting point that corresponds 
closely to the actual situation of the economy, presumably one that reflects current 
conditions as closely as possible. 
We have performed multiplier calculations using the IHS Global Insight model of 
the United States economy, a highly disaggregated modern used as a regular platform for 
business cycle prediction.  While it attempts to include elements of New Keynesian and 
Neoclassical growth economics, it is built largely around the Keynesian demand 
paradigm. The simulation performance of this system is roughly consistent with those 
obtained in other macroeconometric models of the US economy.
7 
 In Table 5, we show recent multiplier calculations based on simulations of the 
IHS Global Insight model (Global Insight, undated).  Short-run business cycle behavior 
                                                           
6 For a discussion, see Global Insight (undated). 
7 For example, see Hemming et al., 2002, Table 1.    
  14of the quarterly model is driven principally by developments in aggregate demand, which 
the model articulates in considerable detail.  Demand-supply interactions govern the 
evolution of wages and prices and so the net response to innovations in demand.   Over 
the long run, the economy expands through labor force growth, capital accumulation and 
increases in productivity, consistent with neoclassical growth models.  Forward-looking 
expectations also influence the path of the economy, although rational expectations are 
not assumed.  The model economy is linked to the international sector through trade in 
goods and services, exchange rates and commodity prices. 
We perform three simulations: (1) an exogenous increase in real Federal 
government consumption spending, (2) a reduction in marginal (and average) personal 
income tax rates, and (3) the introduction of a broad investment tax credit.  In each case, 
the policy changes are imposed as permanent changes over the forecast horizon.   There 
are several noteworthy results: 
Looking at the first panel of Table 5, we confirm the result that impacts of 
spending changes have larger dollar-for-dollar impacts than tax changes.  The model’s 
expenditure multiplier, which peaks at 1.9, is at the high end of the expected range, while 
the income tax impact is just under 1.  The near-term impact of the investment tax credit 
is just a bit larger than that of the tax change. 
The dynamic pattern of effects shows that the largest initial stimulus is associated 
with fiscal spending, while the impact of the investment tax credit builds gradually over 
time, reaching 2.0 after sixteen quarters, because of lagged response of production to he 
accumulating capital stock.  
  15Table 5 
Econometric Model Multipliers 
(% Change / %Change in Policy Variable as % of GDP) 
 
 Effect  After: 
  4  quarters  8  quarters  12 quarters  16 quarters 
 Real  GDP 
Government Consumption  1.9 1.9 1.7  1.4
Personal income tax rate  0.8 0.9 0.9  0.9
Investment tax credit  1.1 1.5 1.8  2.0
 
  Employment 
Government Consumption  1.1 1.4 1.3  1.0
Personal income tax rate  0.5 0.7 0.7  0.7
Investment tax credit  0.5 0.9 1.1  1.1
 
  Real Private Consumption 
Government Consumption  1.0 1.3 1.2  1.0
Personal income tax rate  1.2 1.6 1.7  1.8
Investment tax credit  0.5 1.1 1.5  1.8
 
  Real Business Fixed Investment 
Government Consumption  3.1 2.7 1.3  0.6
Personal income tax rate  1.1 1.2 0.5  0.2
Investment tax credit  8.3 9.9 11.1  12.1




Increasing near-term employment is the biggest concern at present, and here 
direct government spending wins hands down.  The second panel of the table shows that 
each one percent of GDP increase in Federal spending raises employment by 1.1% in the 
first year and 1.4% by the end of year 2.  Income tax and investment tax cuts yield less 
than half the amount of job creation initially, although this gap closes over time.   
Where the investment tax credit excels, not surprisingly, is in its longer-run 
effects.  The permanent credit produces a large investment response, with each percent of 
  16reduction in tax revenues producing a 12 percent increase in investment spending after 
four years, as shown in the last panel of the table.   As a result the boost to GDP rises 
over time, after twelve quarters exceeding that of government spending, which begins to 
taper off.  This demonstrates the potentially powerful growth effects of incentive-type 
fiscal policies over the long term.   Interestingly, the same cannot be said for income tax 
cuts, which, in this model, primarily stimulate consumption spending. 
Taken as a whole, these model simulations support the presumption in favor of 
direct government spending to target output and job growth in the short run, while 
demonstrating the potential advantage of investment incentives for expanding growth 
over longer horizons.   
General Equilibrium Model Results 
  There is a broad consensus among economists that traditional macroeconometric 
models have not taken into account sufficiently the field’s micro theoretical foundations. 
Woodford (2009) refers to current theoretical thinking as the “new synthesis”. The idea is 
to incorporate an intertemporal general equilibrium structure, one that makes growth 
models and business cycle models consistent with each other.  Rational expectations is 
central to these systems.  On the other hand, they recognize important market 
imperfections such as price and/or wage rigidities, investment  adjustment  costs,  etc.     
The Smets and Wouters model (Smets and Wouters, 2007) is a small structural dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—14 exogenous variables, and 7 exogenous 
shocks, much more aggregated than traditional macroeconometric systems. Its parameters 
are estimated by Bayesian techniques on 7 quarterly data series. Cogan et al. (2009) have 
  17used such a model to estimate multipliers for increases in government spending on 
economic activity.  The results  are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Impact of Increase in Government Spending in the Smets/Wouters Model 
(% effect on GDP of a permanent increase in spending of 1% of GDP) 
 
After 1 quarter  After 4 quarters  After 8 quarters  After 12 quarters 
1.05 0.89 0.61 0.44 
 
 The explanation for the rapid decline of the multiplier from its initial level near 
unity appears to lie in a strong and rapid crowding out of private investment and 
consumption.  It is not certain, however, whether this response reflects reality or rather 
the structural constraints of the model.  Chari et al. (2009) argue that the government 
spending shock in this model covers a broad category and has little to do with 
“government spending”, having a variance greatly in excess of that typically observed for 
this category.   On this basis and on the basis of other concerns, Chari et al. argue that 
“the New Keynesian models are not yet useful for policy analysis.” (p. 265)  
Why Has the Economic Stimulus Program Not Been More Effective?  
Despite the stimulus program, at the time of writing, March, 2010, United States 
GDP remains approximately 9 percent below its potential and the unemployment rate, 
presently 9.7 percent, is approximately 5 percent higher than it would be at full 
employment.  Why has the enormous $787 billion stimulus of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), enacted in February 2009, not done more to 
bring the economy back? As we discuss further below, this is not just a matter of 
multipliers.  The impact of a stimulus depends critically on how the funding is 
allocated—between spending, tax cuts, transfer benefits, and payments to the states, for 
  18example.  And importantly, it depends on the time scheduling of the expenditures, how 
quickly they are disbursed. We note that: 
1.  The Great Recession has been more severe than had been expected.  In the 
absence of a stimulus program (and the $700 billion TARP program to 
deal with financial crisis), the situation of the economy would have been a 
good deal worse. 
2.  As many economists have pointed out, the stimulus program was not 
sufficiently large.  On the basis of the multipliers in Table 5 above, we 
estimate that the impact would be 3.6 percent of GDP for the years 2009 
and 2010.
8  Using Okun’s law (a 1 percent increase in GDP translates into 
an roughly 0.5% decrease in the unemployment rate), we estimate that 
unemployment has been reduced by 1.8 percent
9.  In other words, in the 
absence of the stimulus program, the recession would have been 
considerably more severe.  A similar picture is illustrated in the 
Congressional Budget Office’s estimates (Figure 1) and in Romer and 
Bernstein (2009).  Note, moreover, that CBO had underestimated the 
depth of the recession and had assumed a V shaped recovery.  Even so, 
their estimates do not bring the economy back to potential output until 
2014.   
3.  The expenditures in ARRA are allocated to a variety of purposes.  (Table 
7.)  Some of these measures, like income tax cuts and transfer payments 
                                                           
8 The CBO estimates an impact on GDP between 1.2 and 3.2 percent and an impact on employment of 600 
thousand to 1.6 million.  (CBO 2009)  The major consulting firms have estimated an impact of 2.5 million 
jobs (New York Times 2/17/2010) but that figure must be spread over 2 years. Also see the discussion 
quarter-by-quarter in the CEA (2010b). 
 
  19that make up an important share, have relatively small multipliers.
10 Other 
measures benefit the budgets of states and local areas, but may simply be 
avoiding cuts in spending that would otherwise have been made over the 
next fiscal years.  Government investment spending has likely been more 
effective but represents only a small share of the total and some of the 
programs stretch out over many years. “The types of stimulus that could 
get out the door most quickly, in particular tax cuts, tend to have a smaller 
impact on GDP growth than increases in government investment 
spending.” (CEA, 2010a, p23)  
4.  The ARRA program has been slow in getting started. As of December 
2009, only one third had been disbursed. (CEA, 2010a) While the tax cuts 
take force immediately, the government spending initiatives take time.   
Much planning and permitting is required to initiate investment projects.  
The shovels simply were not ready! And, it turns out that road repair 
projects are much less labor intensive today than they were in the thirties. 
Estimates by the Council of Economic Advisers, using simple VAR projection 
procedures to establish a no stimulus baseline, confirms our view that the stimulus 
program, while too small to close the output gap, has improved conditions to some 
extent.  They find that by 2009.4 GDP was 2.0% higher than it would have been in the 
absence of stimulus.  In a similar calculation, the impact on employment is estimated at 2 
million jobs. (CEA, 2010a) 
                                                           
10 Note that temporary tax reductions and transfer payments go in significant part to pay off debts or to 
build bank balances, as shown by cross section surveys.  
  20It is clear that the ARRA stimulus is having an impact on the economy, one that is 
likely to be more apparent in 2010 than it was in 2009.  But it is also apparent that, 
barring a quick natural resurgence of the economy that is not presently expected, 
additional stimulus programs will be required to bring the economy back to full 
employment in the near term. 
  Table  7     
  Content of  the ARRA Stimulus Program   
    $  billions   
Personal and Corporate Tax Relief  288 36.6%
State and Local Fiscal Relief    144 18.3%
Aid to Low Income Workers    81 10.3%
Investment in Roads, Bridges, etc.  111 14.1%
Energy      43 5.5%
Health Care      59 7.5%
Education and Training    53 6.7%
Other      8 1.0%
     787 100.0%
Source:  Wikipedia. 
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Conclusions 
The results of multiplier studies of the impact of spending and tax policies differ 
greatly depending on the methodology and its underlying assumptions. Such differences 
have become particularly apparent, as economists have attempted to impose 
microeconomic constraints on their modeling systems and to utilize constrained VAR 
estimation methods.  The variation of results in recent studies lends only dubious support 
to some rather strong policy recommendations, for example, favoring tax cuts over 
expenditure stimulus.   
Nevertheless, disagreements about the effectiveness of fiscal policies for 
stabilization are not as serious as the rhetoric would suggest.  Most computations, 
  22whether model based or statistical, suggest that the multipliers for government 
expenditures are positive but not exceptionally large, in the 1 to 2 range.  Most studies 
suggest that the multipliers for general tax cuts or transfer payments are somewhat 
smaller.  There is not agreement on whether there are significant adverse effects of 
increased government spending on consumption or investment, an issue that seems to 
depend greatly on the constraints imposed on the underlying model.. Tax or expenditure 
programs that embody expenditure incentives for the private sector, like the investment 
tax credit or the homebuyer credit, may have advantages on a per dollar of expenditure 
basis over income tax changes or other current expenditure programs. However, the 
timing of their impact may make them less effective devices for economic stabilization 
than for achieving long run growth.  
The US economic stimulus has not been more effective because, large as it is, it 
has not been sufficient to offset the impact of a serious recession and because it has been 
phased in slowly.  The difficulties of achieving more rapid implementation of a stimulus 
program have become apparent.  Multiplier simulations and other studies suggest that the 
recession would have been considerably more serious in the absence of the economic 
stimulus program. 
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